Review: Money where the (Sinhala) mouth is

Money where the (Sinhala) mouth is
by Eelapalan
Nov. 30, 2013



Following the money trail often leads to interesting findings. Sri Lanka’s 2014 budget is no exception. It is as Sinhala Buddhist as its constitution is but this analysis only focuses on one aspect which is the militarization.


Reference in the title to the Sinhala mouth is intentional. It is to highlight how it is being fed for the time being and how it is could potentially be robbed of food in the future. (Disclaimer: I am more interested in highlighting the general pattern through a trend analysis instead through absolute numbers. But would welcome input on accurate numbers if readers do have access. )


Of the eight sectors, National security & Law enforcement takes up 12.5% (Rs.309,057,392) of the total budget. To put it in context, that is more than both health and education combined total (Rs. 270,596,000). (1). This has been increasing year over year even after the war has ended. 80% of the total budget for this sector is for, curiously combined, Defence and Urban Development. A mere 20% is allocated for the other half of the sector heading which are Law & order, Justice, Rehabilitation and Prison Reform. And, of the total budget for this sector, 84% is recurrent expenditure: Meant for upkeep and maintenance. On the other hand, one subcategory, State Intelligence Service, got a whopping 717% year over year (YoY) increase for its Capital Expenditure.: Meant for Expansion.


So where does this lead to?

Occupation is an expensive business

Active combat is over and it is unlikely in any foreseeable future. So why an exorbitant amount of money is being spent in the name of Defense and National security in a country that has no external enemy? Sinhala nation would soon realize occupation is as (or more) expensive as the war was. Military occupation, as referred to by the elected Chief Minister of North Province and many others, to be successful, requires two key elements. One is troop saturation and the other is a pervasive Intelligent apparatus.

Troop Saturation

Sri Lanka has one of the highest percentage of military per work force in the world. Sri Lanka is ranked 25th on armed personnel per labor force at a 2.59% on this site. The first person to broach this subject in the island is Sivaram. In a brilliant analysis he did in 1997, titled, The Cat, a bell and a few strategists, he analysed the conflict through the concept of MPR (Military Participation Ratio). He concluded correctly, at that time, that LTTE would not need to abandon the military option. But when he said “ The maximum degree to which the [Sri Lankan] army can raise its manpower, other things being equal, may not therefore go much beyond .82 percent of the Sinhala population”, it turned out to be incorrect. Sri Lankan military did raise its manpower beyond that and it happened with recruitments during cease fires periods (1995, 2001). See this chart. Even Though this chart is for armed personnel per labor force it correlates the same way to the armed personnel per Sinhala population base.


If the state is willing to recruit during the peacetime, Sinhala youth were willing to join the military in bigger numbers.


I believe the percentage of armed personnel per labor force in Sri Lanka, looked at it correctly, it much higher. Sri Lanka budget proposal deliberately does not list the numbers for the military personnel but does so for the police. So a quick reverse engineering (Explained at the end of the post ) shows that the total military personnel in Sri Lanka by conservative measure will be over 350,000. it is in line with this Srilanka Campaigninfographic. The very latest statistics from Sri Lanka shows a labor force of (Counted as 15 & above) 8,861, 919. So this alone would put the percentage of armed personnel per labor force at 4%, making Sri Lanka the 12th, not the 25th, in the world. But that still does not reveal the entire trend. If you were to account for the military recruitment age and understand one absolutely important factor that the Sri Lankan military is mono ethnic, it would move Sri Lanka well above in the ranking. Sri Lankan military is Sinhala, mono ethnic is important for two reasons. One, it shows the military participation and the dependence of the Sinhala nation on it (shown later). Second, it shows a much deeper sociological order of externalizing occupation.


Lets look at the second reason first. Heavily militarized Sinhala society export its men (some women) to the Tamil lands. As the earlier SriLanka campaign infographic shows and this site highlights, almost the entire ( 19 out of 20 divisions) Sinhala military is stationed in Tamil areas. It is not a wonder then that the ethnic reaction to this occupation is polarized. And explains why the state continues to pour more and more money, as allocated in the 2014 budget, into maintaining a saturated military presence in the Tamil regions.

Intelligence Apparatus

In order to sustain that occupation among a hostile population, the state needs to expand its intelligence apparatus. The 2014 budget shows a whopping 717% year over year increase in the capital expenditure for the State Intelligence Service. Tamils can be sure of increasing intimidation and harassment in the coming years.

Return on Occupation

In the corporate world, any time money is spent, the results are measured by the Return on that investment. So what do Sinhalese and Tamils get in return for this budget spent?

Sinhala Nation

Sinhala narrative is that of heros going to a far off land and fighting the good fight. But when they come back and the money does not, would the Sinhala nation reaction be different?


I would suggest that the Sinhala economical order is propped up by remittance. External worker remittance has been the highest revenue generator for the country amounting to 8% of the GDP. More than 70% of the Sri Lankan population is categorized as rural. It is from here most of the unskilled labor for the foreign labor market is drawn from. How much this remittance economy has permeated into the Sinhala sociological order would make an interesting study if one does not exist already. Does this external worker remittance mindset also explain the remittance of the Sinhala military serving in Tamil regions?


A critical study by Selvarathinam Santhirasegaram of the Jaffna University shows “how military expansion in Sri Lanka contributed to achieve.. macroeconomic goal [of], reduction of unemployment and poverty.”. And his study concludes that it is so in the Sinhala areas because the military is Sinhala. So the Sinhala nation has an economic dependency on the military and benefits from the expansion as long as it happens externally in the Tamil regions. Sinhala nation recently witnessed the implications of militarization it its own soil in Welliweriya. That military response to a civilian protest generated the outrage it deserved among the Sinhalese and others. Unfortunately it never translated into an empathy for the Tamils. Tamil civilians are facing the same, but alien, Military at a saturation level of 3:1.


So what do Tamils get in return for the money spent?

Tamil Nation

Tamils continue to face the onslaught of occupation. Unable to remember the dead, and unable to move on with their daily life without military intrusion. The recent UN report highlighted the impact of the militarization on the Tamils. How close military installations are to a Tamil and how often they are visited by military men are documented in that report. This psychological and physical abuse by occupation is not the entire picture. Since we are on the topic of money, the economical impact is important.


Sri Lanka, when collecting statistics, groups employment by three industry groups: Agriculture, Industries, and services. Armed forces are counted under the Services group. But in the north and east armed forces are intruding into the agriculture and the industries groups as a way to generate revenue to offset the cost of the occupation. Infographic by the Sri Lanka Campaign and the report by the International Crisis Group highlight this phenomenon. This encroachment into other employment groups denies livelihood to the Tamils.


The 2014 budget of Sri Lanka is a further indication (as if another one is needed) of the entrenched and structural nature of oppression Tamils are facing in the island. A budget that aims to fund the occupation by troop saturation and expansion of intelligence services. If we are to learn from history, no amount of oppression will keep the Tamils wallowing in apathy. If the Sinhala nation continues to tolerate this alarming militarization of the Island, it needs to know those military chickens will one day have to come home to roost.








————————————————————————————————————————————-

A logical calculation of the number of military personnel:

Calculate the annual pay rate of police. and assume the same for others. Divide the annual salary total by the estimated annual pay, this gets a close enough number for the personnel.


Assumptions: Army is not getting combat pay since the end of war. Allowances and others don’t skew too much towards the officers corps as compared to the police.






Police:


Personal Emoluments: 26,995,500,000


employment profile: 79,100


estimated per person annual spend: Rs.341283






Army:


Personal Emoluments: 93,582,860,000


per person annual spend: Rs.341283


Estimated employment profile: 274,208






Navy:


Personal Emoluments: 26,356,000,000


per person annual spend: Rs.341283


Estimated employment profile: 77226






Airforce:


Personal Emoluments: 20,988,100,000


per person annual spend: Rs.341283


Estimated employment profile: 61497






STF:


Personal Emoluments: 3,402,900,000


per person annual spend: Rs.341283


Estimated employment profile: 9970






total military (excluding police) : 422901

Read more!

Review: A new day in Asia

A new day in Asia
by C. Raja Mohan
Indian Express
Dec. 2, 2013

Rapidly unfolding developments to our east and west — the unexpected détente between the United States and Iran and the growing confrontation between China and Japan — demand that New Delhi discard its traditional impulse to view Asia through the anti-Western prism. The idea of Asian solidarity against the West, developed during the colonial era, has long been presumed to be a fundamental principle of India's foreign policy.
Despite repeated challenges to this proposition from the real world, Delhi pretends that nothing has changed. Unlike in the past, India's reluctance to confront the sources of Asian geopolitics will involve many costs. A globalised Indian economy today is very sensitive to regional developments, and ideological posturing meant for domestic politics could complicate the pursuit of India's national interests in Asia.

At the same time, given its size and the relative increase in its regional weight, India is in a good position to shape regional outcomes. But only if Delhi is ready to shed some of its foreign policy shibboleths. India must come to terms with the fact that some of the major certitudes that guided global politics since the end of the Cold War are beginning to fade way. Post-Cold War triumphalism in America gave birth to extraordinary hubris. Both the left and right in America believed that US power is inexhaustible and can be deployed to change the world. This delusion translated into profound tragedies in the greater Middle East. The hope that America can promote democracy, rebuild failed states and roll back the spread of advanced technologies across the developing world has come a cropper in the Middle East.

After two exhausting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, US President Barack Obama has become the biggest champion of a restrained foreign policy for America. In avoiding a military involvement in Syria and actively seeking a modus vivendi with Iran, Obama has invited the wrath of American foreign policy hawks. But his decision to put America on a less adventurous path in the Middle East and focus on nation-building at home has much popular support. Many people in the world, including in India, who agonised about unrestrained American power, must now come to terms with an America that is ready to downsize its global role.

Obama's realism was not enough to produce the interim nuclear accord with Iran; it needed pragmatism in Tehran. President Hassan Rouhani, backed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has challenged the powerful domestic proponents of a permanent confrontation with the US. While the effort by Rouhani and Obama might yet fall apart, there is no denying that anti-Americanism is no longer politically chic in Asia. Few countries in the world have had so many real reasons to be anti-American than the Islamic Republic of Iran — from the CIA coup against an elected leader in 1954, to support for an authoritarian monarchy that lasted many decades, to an intense hostility to Tehran since the revolution of 1979. In seeking political accommodation with the US, which has been long demonised in Iran, and offering significant nuclear concessions, Rouhani and Khamenei have buried the logic of anti-Americanism in the Middle East.

If the relative decline of America has begun to induce some political realism into US foreign policy, the clamour for American support is rapidly rising in East Asia. Stunned by Beijing's assertion of power and its muscular approach to territorial disputes, many of China's Asian neighbours are seeking more intensive defence and security cooperation with Washington. Communist Vietnam, which fought against America in the 1960s and 1970s, is now eager to sustain US military presence in the region. Manila, which threw America out of its naval and air bases at the end of the 1980s, now wants the US military to return and prevent China from nibbling away at the territory of the Philippines.

It is only in India, it seems, ideological considerations take precedence over national security considerations. Keeping some distance from the US in East and West Asia has long been a major theme of Indian diplomacy. While a large nation like India cannot ever align with the US, seeking deliberate distance from Washington for presumed ideological reasons has had a corrosive effect on India's worldview. Recall the debate in 2005, when many foreign policy pundits in Delhi denounced India for voting with the US on the Iran issue at the IAEA. They were asking India to sacrifice its own interests, such as ending its long nuclear isolation, for preserving what was called Delhi's "principled" foreign policy.

In East Asia too, the idea of maintaining distance from the US is now considered important for the preservation of India's strategic autonomy. For many in Asia, in contrast, it is the rise of China that constrains their strategic autonomy. Acknowledging that fact, however, goes against political correctness in the UPA government.

Finally, India's obsession with non-alignment and anti-Western solidarity often prevents it from seeing the multiple contradictions within East and West Asia. In the Middle East, it is not just the US and other great powers that are shaping the region's destiny. The growing contradiction between the interests of Iran and Saudi Arabia and the mounting sectarian tension between the Shia and Sunni are perhaps as consequential today as the role of great powers. In East Asia, China's conflicts with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines are as critical as the uncertainty in the relations between Beijing and Washington.

Managing these regional contradictions will be a major challenge for India's Asia policy in the coming years. Non-alignment, strategic autonomy and Asian solidarity might be attractive slogans for some, but offer no guidance for the conduct of India's foreign policy in East Asia and the Middle East. To cope with the new geopolitical imperatives, India must learn to deal with Asia on its own terms and stop imposing its ideological preferences on the region.

C RAJA MOHAN

The writer is a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation and a contributing editor for 'The Indian Express'

express@expressindia.com
Read more!