Opinion: India Sits on the Sidelines While Time Runs Out

by Gogol G.

I was hoping to avoid using a sports analogy to describe India's dalliance on the issue of the genocide of Tamils by the Sri Lankan government, but I agree with Prof. Boyle that India is trying to run out the clock. I think, also, that India has a problem in choosing which side to play for. Just to be clear, the two sides are the US (and friends) and China (and friends). Prof. Boyle may be right that all countries are trying to run out the clock on Tamils. But I don't see that as much as I see India waiting for the clock to run out, and when the clock runs out, India will be the loser.

We all wait and wonder what India's next move will be. One point that was raised recently is how do we know that India _has_ a foreign policy? We keep thinking that India has a coherent foreign policy (let alone logical), but the reality could be that India has no clue what it is doing. And this, my friends, makes the most sense: India makes no sense. India has successfully demonstrated its cluelessness and weakness since the time of the 2002 peace process onwards, and it has not been so apparent as now.

There are two things that India has done to shoot itself in the foot, and they're related. Firstly, India has taken itself out of the picture in Sri Lanka through diplomatic high-handedness and selfishness. Secondly, it has also failed to realise that its own growth is being greatly surpassed by that of China's (thus making it weaker, relatively), and even its influence in the India Ocean is being overtaken by China. India keeps holding onto the idea of itself as an emerging superpower that owns the Indian Ocean like a rich person who has lost his fortune.

At the beginning of the 2002 peace process, India enjoyed the position of the gatekeeper. It was nice to be able to maintain that grudge against the LTTE to the extent of nearly boycotting the entire peace process, while still requiring all maneuvers by Norway and the West to be reported to India. It allowed India to protect its machismo in the typical, melodramatic South Asian pettiness without seemingly losing any benefits. Maybe the Tigers back then sensed the emerging cold war between the US and China and tried to make amends with India while they fought off China and the US. India refused to acknowledge the Tigers (refused Anton Balasingham from receiving treatment in Chennai, Tamil Nadu or to hold peace talks in Chennai), and its own media outlets insinuated much negativity about the Tigers. The peace process, however, opened up the LTTE to the West, and they toured as much of Europe as they could for as long as they could. They must have known that Norway was the handmaiden of the US, and so to invite Norway as the mediator in their unilateral cease-fires of 2000 and 2001 must have been the LTTE's way to open up that connection. Ultimately, the Tigers wanted the recognition of the West, and in the short-term, they wanted better access to the Tamil Diaspora. As the focus shifted Westward, India's relevance diminished. If the West recognises the Tigers, then who cares what India thinks? In this regard, India is merely lucky that the strength of the Tigers caused all the countries in the world to oppose it (it was so effective in making itself into a military + political state in spite of the latest sophistication in counter-insurgency efforts that it set a dangerous example for rebellions threatening the worldwide order of existing nation-states).

However, from 2001 to 2010, lots of things have changed India's position relative to China. Software took a tumble in 2001, China has engineered amazing growth (as demonstrated in the 2008 Olympics), and India has grown to a lesser degree in spite of its corruption and mismanagement (as evidenced in the 2010 Commonwealth Games). China is shooting its own satellites out of the sky and launching manned space expeditions. India was caught embarrassingly flat-footed in responding to the Mumbai attacks. China quietly was executing its String of Pearls strategy throughout the Indian Ocean. India has continued to have trouble in facing the growing Communist / Maoist / Naxalite threat within its own borders that threatens to destablise the country (let alone Chinese forces on the border causing a military buildup there). India's position was weak enough that India was trying to outspend China in Sri Lanka since 2008 so as to re-gain influence and control over Sri Lanka, even though India had lost its de facto control over Sri Lanka gradually in 2005-2008. Of course, China has been winning that game all along.

As an example, there is this statement from a former high-ranking Indian intelligence official that states India's best position is to not support the UN resolution, but instead just apply the hurt on Sri Lanka economically. The statement also says applying pressure "politically", but given that India's "dilemma in Sri Lanka is due to our inability and unwillingness to talk and act tough when the time for it has come," such as the UN HRC resolution on SL to be voted on in 8 days, I think India has proven itself too weak to apply pressure politically. And the mistake in thinking about the economic pressure idea is that India isn't as irreplaceable to SL as Indians think they are. It is very clear to the Tamils in Sri Lanka how many times in the recent past alone that SL has broken its promises to India. SL still keeps playing off India against China, and this is clearly not a game that the US is interested in playing, and thus it will be a losing cause for India in the long run. So to the Indian ex-intelligence official, if you want to "use the big stick", I hope China doesn't take it from your hands and beat you with it. That will not be in the best interests of India, Tamils of Eelam, or the US.

There is nothing in yesterday's follow-up documentary to The Killing Fields, called Sri Lanka's Killing Fields: War Crimes Unpunished, that makes anyone but China, Iran, and friends feel confident about trusting SL:


It should also be pointed out, as others have done so already, that a mere regime change would not bring about a lasting change, either.

So what does India have left? I don't know, really. If the game that Sri Lanka is playing with the world is really between the US and China, India can't stick to its trick of being neutral for fear of supporting Tamil people somewhere. India has way too many problems internally and with China to do anything but support the US and the Tamils (of Tamil Eelam and Tamil Nadu). And the US needs India's support much less than India needs the US's support. India might enjoy the fact that everybody's attention is on it right now, but that wears thin after a while, really. How indecisive does India have to be before people start to confuse its vanity for incompetence (or both)? Every time that China assures India that they are working together in mutual cooperation, and every time that Sri Lanka assures India that India is Sri Lanka's most important neighbour to the north, India believes it without question.

There's yet another question remaining: is there any other reason causing India to tarry in taking action in such an obvious situation. Others may disagree, but I think that there is only one possible answer left. It is not, as some suggest, the idea that supporting a resolution at the UN HRC will open India up to accusations of war crimes. The US has given perhaps Sarath Fonseka and/or at least one other Sri Lankan army general amnesty in exchange for testimony. The rules are written by the victors, and this human rights effort will certainly spare those prosecuting the effort. If India joins, then I'm sure a level of immunity will be implicit. Thus, believe there is the latent fear (irrational, I believe) that if India supports the US, and the US supports Tamil rights, and this leads to serious Tamil-speaking autonomy in the Northeast, then this might lead to secessionist claims within Indian borders. However, this is a somewhat flawed argument. At the moment, India needs to curb China's advance in the region. Teaming up with the US in Sri Lanka to separate the Tamil-speaking Northeast from the Chinese-friendly, untrustworthy, Singhalese South is the first step in stemming the bleeding that India is experiencing due to China. It would be just one less thing to worry about. Does it matter if China has leverage over the Singhalese South, with its corrupt polity weighed down by its 60+ year old, self-defeating racism and useless, botched infrastructure at Hambantota? Not when you are allies with scrupulous Tamil-speaking multi-faith people (Hindus, Muslims, and Christians) of the Northeast with Trinco harbour and other resources of their own. China is already setting up an airport at Poonakari and power plants near Trinco. The choice India has to make is between: 1) maintain the stability of Sri Lanka, thereby risking the deep penetration of China into the region that would accelerate the fracturing of India, and 2) bring the US in, split the Northeast from the rest of Sri Lanka and deliver justice to the Tamil people in full (even if it means giving up hopes of controlling Sri Lanka entirely), and begin on a path alongside the US of curbing and rebuffing China from South Asia. India's choice is between appearing strong & becoming weak, or appearing weak & becoming strong.

While the UN HRC is set to vote soon on the US resolution for SL to be accountable for HR (lest the next step of an independent international investigation), there is no room for India to dither. That is, unless we're trying to find out how many geopolitical mandarins have to descend on New Delhi before India gets a clue.